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Abstract 
National Socialism never achieved its vision of ‘law’.  The 1958 debate between Fuller and 
Hart, and subsequent literature in the Anglo-American legal philosophical tradition has thus 
never addressed the question of what concept of law is compatible with Nazism’s ultimate 
goals and what we might learn from such a concept about the relationship between law and 
evil.  This essay first shows how law reform was far from complete by the time the war 
ended. It then demonstrates how the mystic, ‘volkish’ movement informed the Nazi vision for 
law.  It will then be seen that this concept simply does not fit with some very basic shared 
assumptions from which the Fuller and Hart debate proceeds. This reveals the degree to 
which concepts of law within the Anglo-American jurisprudential tradition must accept that 
law has a specific moral content.  Such concepts of law are incompatible with a bullying form 
of oppression that was at the core of Nazism’s moral bankruptcy. 
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Spirit without Letter: How Volkish Nazi Law Falls Outside Fuller’s and Hart’s 
Concepts of Law  
The 1958 debate between Lon Fuller and HLA Hart is the most influential in Anglo-
American legal philosophy. Among other issues, it addressed the possibility of ‘writing 
cruelties, intolerances, and inhumanities into law’, taking up a theme central to Gustav 
Radbruch’s later work.1  Aspects of the legal system in place during the Second World War 
in Nazi Germany were used to unpack this problem. A subsequent, vast, literature in the 
Anglo-American jurisprudential tradition has taken the law of Nazi Germany as a starting 
point for discussion as to the possibility of a ‘wicked legal system’ more generally. The 
subtext is that if the Nazis had law, then law itself must be compatible with the worst kinds of 
evil.
2
 This thought experiment is incomplete. Nazi senior command (and Nazi legal 
philosophers) did not see the legal system in place during this era as compatible with their 
specific form of moral bankruptcy. It tells us little about the relationship between evil and law 
if the legal system in place was considered unfit for purpose by the evildoers themselves. If 
we really wish to know whether the very concept of ‘law’, as understood by either Fuller or 
Hart, can persist in a morally reprehensible regime, we must look not to the decaying form of 
                                                          
1
 HLA Hart ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593, Lon Fuller 
‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 630. For a sense 
of how profoundly this debate changed the intellectual landscape for legal academics in the United Kingdom 
and North America see Nicola Lacey A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 155-243. 
2
 See, for example, David Dyzenhaus Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: Pathologies of Legality 2
nd
 Edition 
(Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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an existing legal system that remained in Nazi Germany, but to the concept of ‘law’ that was 
guiding its efforts to replace that system. Once we do this we will see that neither Fuller nor 
Hart could have accepted the Nazi ideal of a legal system as truly falling within their 
conception of law at all.  This highlights a very specific form of evil that mainstream, Anglo-
American legal philosophy cannot accept within its concept of law.  As such, any concept of 
law within the tradition of Hart or Fuller has a specific moral content.  
 
 
1. The Meaning of a “Concept” of Law 
In his debate with Fuller, Hart warned against ‘the arid waste of inappropriate definition’, 
when it comes to a concept as ‘vague’ and ‘many-sided’ as a legal system.3  If we rigidly 
define ‘legal system’ in advance, if we claim that any legal system worthy of the name must 
display a certain set of characteristics there is a risk that we will exclude legal systems that 
might fall outside a ‘standard case’.  Later he would discuss so-called ‘primitive law’ and 
International Law as just such examples.  It is largely for this reason that Hart wrote of a 
concept of law instead of a definition.  Hart was far more amenable to the notion that we 
might genuinely investigate law as a concept if we make the more modest claim that ‘no such 
system has ever existed or could long endure’.4 Later, he would take the system with which 
he is most familiar, that of municipal law, as a starting point to unpack some essential 
features that would help when it comes to analysis of less standard cases.  Yet it is largely on 
the basis of a roughly shared common understanding of a concept of law that Hart’s debate 
with Fuller can proceed at all.  Otherwise, they would simply have talked past each other.  
Each assumes that law is rule-based and that it governs human behaviour; as Fuller notes, he 
                                                          
3
 Hart (n 1) 622 
4
 Ibid 
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and Hart also agree that law is conceptually distinct from ‘a simple fiat of power’, and that 
the notions of ‘rule of law’ and a sense of ‘fidelity to law’ are vital elements within that 
concept.
5
  Their debate is around a penumbral example, the legal system in place in Nazi 
Germany.  For Hart, this falls within the concept of law; Fuller had no objection to the notion 
that this system fell outside the concept. Here, we are interested in the type of legal system 
that Nazism itself would have considered compatible with its evil ends.  As we will see, that 
system falls outside the assumptions about ‘law’ as a concept shared by the positivist Hart 
and the natural lawyer Fuller. 
In the next section, I show how Nazism never created a legal system with which it 
was satisfied, or even came close to doing so.  Then, I provide a loose outline of the system 
that the dominant version of Nazism needed to build.  I go on to argue that under the shared 
features of Hart’s and Fuller’s working concept of law “no [such] system…has ever existed 
or could endure”.  
 
2. The Nazi System by 1945 
When ‘Nazi law’ is invoked in Anglo-American legal philosophy, there is a tendency to treat 
this phenomenon as though it emerged, fully formed, in 1933.  This is an error. For sure, law 
‘reform’ allowed the Nazi party to establish a totalitarian state and eliminate opposition from 
power.  Crucially for our purposes, however, none of this was considered enough.  The 
relationship between the legal profession and senior command was fractious to the end.  Yet 
the profession was fully ‘Nazified’ by the ‘Bringing-into-line’ legislation; Jews and political 
opponents had been systematically removed. It was not crass racism or dictatorial powers to 
which the judiciary objected.  What they were increasingly being asked to do was 
                                                          
5
 Fuller (n 1) 632 
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incompatible with what they thought of as legal practice.  All of this serves to show how very 
different Nazi senior command’s vision of a legal system was from anything in existence at 
the time, even by the later stages of the Nazi regime.   
  The Reichstag Fire of 27
th
 February 1933 provided the party with the opportunity to 
pass The Law to Remedy the Distress of the Volk and the Reich (better known as ‘The 
Enabling Act’) on 23rd March that year. This act in effect granted dictatorial powers to Hitler 
as Chancellor.
6
  Various pieces of ‘Bringing into Line’ legislation were then passed by the 
cabinet with no need for parliamentary assent.  These Acts radically altered all facets of 
public life from the civil service to the medical profession.  This included radical reform of 
the legislative process, court system, membership of the judiciary, education of lawyers and 
permission to practise law. It also included reform to family law and tax law, each of which 
was used as a means of disenfranchising Jews and other ‘enemies’.7  These reforms, though 
sweeping, were unfinished.  In speeches to the Reichstag Hitler repeatedly promised a new 
constitution as part of ‘comprehensive reform of the Reich’. 8   This constitution never 
materialised, nor did the ‘People’s Code’, sketched by Hans Frank in 1934.9    
Tension between Nazi high command and the judiciary was evident during the 
proceedings of the Reichstag fire trial. Even a judiciary utterly, farcically, biased in favour of 
                                                          
6
  Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich (Ermächtigungsgesetz) (23. März 1933), Reichsgesetzblatt, 
1933 discussed in Ingo Müller Hitler’s Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich (Deborah Lucas Schneider tr, 
Harvard University Press, 1991) 27-35, it was already established that law could be broken in times of 
emergency, a provision relied on by Nazi jurists. Nonetheless, much 1933 terror took place without the 
‘Reichstag Fire Decree’ justification, ibid 50-58. 
7
 Michael Stolleis, The Law Under the Swastika: Studies in Legal History in Nazi Germany (Thomas Dunlap tr, 
University of Chicago Press, 1998).  For discussion of the impact on day-to-day existence see Kristen Rundle 
‘Law and daily life: Questions for legal philosophy from November 1938’ (2012) 3(2) Jurisprudence 429. 
8
 See especially his speeches of 23
rd
 March, 1933, 30th January 1934, and 30th January 1937, excerpts from 
which are reproduced in Norman Baynes (tr. and ed.) The Speeches of Adolf Hitler Volume 1: April 1922-August 
1939 (Oxford University Press, 1942) 424-425.  In effect the Weimar constitution was superseded by ‘the will 
of the Führer’ ibid, 413, 419, see also Carl Schmitt, State, Movement, People (Simona Draghici tr, Plutarch 
Press, 2001). 
9
 Manchester Guardian, 10 Sept. 1934, the same was true of a new Military Criminal Code, which had civil 
jurisdiction, see Müller (n 6) 183-184.  Multiple legislative reforms were drafted but never ratified, see Stolleis 
(n 7) 14-21. 
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the party struggled to act as anything resembling a judiciary yet still satisfy Nazi leadership.
10
  
This discontent culminated in a meeting of senior officialdom, including Hitler, in March 
1934.  It was agreed that a Special People’s Court should be established to hear treason 
cases.
11
  This ‘People’s Court’ ought to have been the Nazi legal vehicle par excellence.  It 
was created by the party.  The bench included lay-judges, drawn from Nazi officer classes.
12
  
The Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service 1933 guaranteed that all 
surviving members of the professional judiciary were loyal to the Führer and movement.  
Furthermore, the scope of this court increased throughout its eleven years so that virtually all 
criminal offences were considered instances of ‘treason’13.  Yet, neither The People’s Court 
nor the court system generally ever fully functioned in line with what came to be dominant 
Nazi ideology.  Émigrés like Karl Lowenstein opined that Nazi efforts to simplify the judicial 
system had the opposite effect.
14
  The demarcation between police powers and judicial 
authority was also uncertain, a point raised by the President of the Higher State Court in 
Hamm in a letter to Roland Freisler, then Secretary of State in the Ministry of Justice, on 31
st
 
March, 1941.
15
 In the same year, the British historian Norman Baynes noted that the courts 
remained one area of civic life which had yet to be governed by ‘the principle of decision by 
the single Leader-personality’16.  At that point, Freisler, was calling for this very reform.17 
One year later Freisler became President of the Volksgerichtshof or ‘People’s Court’. 
                                                          
10
 See Müller (n 6) 30-33 
11
 H.W. Koch, In the Name of the Volk: Political Justice in Hitler’s Germany (St Martin’s Press, 1989) 44-45 
see also Müller (n 6) 140-145. 
12
 Koch (n 11) 48 such lay judges would become predominant, with very few pre-1933 professional members of 
the judiciary left by 1945. 
13
 Ibid 4-6, 58-60 and 133. For data, see Jeremy Noakes (ed) Nazism 119-1945 Volume 4: The German Home 
Front in World War II, A Documentary Reader (University of Exeter Press, 1998) 123 see generally Koch, 
above n 10, 11-69 and Matthew Lippman ‘They Shoot Lawyers Don’t They? Law in the Third Reich and the 
Global Threat to the Independence of the Judiciary’ (1993) 23 (2) California Western International Law Journal 
257, 268-272. 
14
 See Karl Lowenstein ‘Law in the Third Reich’ (1936) 45 Yale Law Journal 779, 794, 809. 
15
 Bundesarchiv Berlin R 58/990 translated into English in Noakes (n 13) 143.  See also the monthly report of 
the General State Prosecutor in Berlin from 31
st
 March 1942, Bundesarchiv Berlin R 22/3367 ibid 143. 
16
 Speeches (n 8) 418. 
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A 1942 decree by Hitler illustrates the dissatisfaction.  He sought ‘confirmation’ of 
his power to ‘intervene directly in [certain] cases and remove judges who are obviously not 
aware of the necessity of the hour’ in a speech to the Reichstag, on 26th April.18   This was 
followed by sweeping reforms to senior personnel, including the appointment of a new Reich 
Minister of Justice, a new Secretary of State, a new President of the Academy for German 
Law, and a reshuffle that moved Freisler to the position of Judge President of the People’s 
Court.  All of this was conducted in order to create greater cooperation between the 
Ministries of Justice and Propaganda as Goebbels attested.
19
   
This was a clear usurpation of legal autonomy and it trampled the last vestiges of a 
separation of powers.
20
  It occurred less than three years before the end of the regime, yet it 
was not radical enough.  On the 20
th
 August, 1942, Hitler held a private meeting with the 
newly appointed Reich Minister for Justice, Otto Thierack, new State Secretary Curt 
Rothenberger, and Reich Minister Hans Lammers.  During a lengthy discussion, Hitler 
remarked that:  
…very far-reaching reforms are required in our judicial system.  But they must be 
introduced gradually, and concurrently with the gradual reorganisation of the 
whole legal profession.
21
   
He further stated that Thierack was ‘empowered to diverge from the existing law’. 
Thierack began to issue ‘Richterbriefe’ to all sitting judges in the autumn of 1942.  Several of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
17
 Roland Freisler ‘Etwas über Führertum in der Rechtspflege’, Schriften der Akademie für Deutsches Recht, 
Sonderdsruck No. 1, Berlin, 1935. 
18
 Max Domarus Hitlers Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945: Vol 4 (Wiesbaden, 1973) 1874 English 
translation in Koch (n 11) 113-114.   
19
 ibid 118. A study by Otto Peter Schweling into military justice during the National socialist era suggested that 
decisions were largely free from Nazi spirit until 1939, see Die deutsche Militärjustiz in der Zeit des 
Nationalsozialismus (Elwert, 1978). As Stolleis notes, however, this study is highly unreliable for a number of 
reasons, see Stolleis (n 7) 145-149. 
20
 During the Weimar period, an activist judiciary had intruded upon legislative powers. Nevertheless, this 
judiciary was often sympathetic towards Nazism, Koch (n 11) 14-18. 
21
 Norman Cameron and RH Stevens (trs and eds) Hitler’s Table Talk 1941-44: His Private Conversations (2nd 
ed., Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1973) 645. 
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these would appear, every year, until the end of the war, each with a reformist agenda.  
Recurring themes included the need to have training and decision-making conform to the 
wishes of the Führer and the notion that punishment should be more severe, in particular for 
non-Aryan defendants.
22
  The final Richterbrief was issued in December 1944, a mere six 
months before Hitler took his own life. In 1944, Thierack also established an indoctrination 
centre for judges, devised to offer ‘a new method of guidance’ according to his remarks at a 
conference for German legal academics.
23
   As late as 15
th
 February 1945 Thierack issued the 
‘Decree for the Establishment of Summary Courts in Areas of the Reich Threatened by the 
Enemy’. An entirely new level of court was thereby added to the judicial system wherein the 
only possible verdicts were death, acquittal or transfer to another court.
24
   
The image that emerges is one of constant, sweeping reform, right up until the end of 
the regime.
25
    None of this is to absolve the judiciary and other enforcers of Nazi law for 
their parts in the evil that was achieved.
26
  Existing legal provisions and the Weimar 
Constitution played vital roles in Nazism’s acquisition and consolidation of power.27  Yet, 
whatever the depths of our disgust for how law was used to achieve heinous ends, the 
dominant form of Nazism never came close to achieving its vision for law.  At a dinner on 
the 22
nd
 July 1942, Hitler expressed the view that it would take at least one generation before 
this would be the case.
28
  Meanwhile, the bench remained hostile to non-lawyers telling it 
                                                          
22
 For examples see Lippman (n 13) 272-278. 
23
 16
th
 September 1944, in Heinz Boberach (ed) Richterbriefe: Dokumente zur Beeinglussing der deuthschen 
Rechtsprechung 1942-1944 (Boppard, 1975) 469-472, English translation by Noakes (n 13) 152-153, 153. 
24
 Reichsgesetzblatt (1945) I 30, for analysis see Müller (n 6) 189-191, Lippman (n 13) 286-287.  
25
 Koch describes it as ‘a permanent atmosphere of crisis’, (n 10) 86 see also Kristen Rundle, ‘The Impossibility 
of an Exterminatory Legality: Law and the Holocaust’ (2009) 59 University of Toronto Law Journal 65, 73-4 
26
 Ibid 68, see generally US v Josef Alstoetter et al, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals, Vol III, ‘The Justice Case’ (United States Government Printing Office, 1951).  Freisler died in a 
bombing raid in 1944, Thierack was arrested but killed himself before trial.  Schlegelberger was the most senior 
judge convicted. His brief tenure as Minister of Justice suggests that his vision of law was less acceptable to 
senior leadership than that of his replacement, Thierack.  Sentences were lenient.  It was accepted that these 
judges, though guilty, provided something of a check against the regime. 
27
 Koch (n 11) 19-27, 32-37. Some judges tried to preserve constitutional principles until around 1941, in 
particular the Prussian Administrative High Court, see Stolleis (n 7), 137-138 
28
 Table Talk (n 21) 585 
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how to judge.  This was exemplified in the monthly report to the Reich Justice Ministry from 
the President of the Higher State Court in Cologne, in December 1942.
29
   A true evaluation 
of the Nazi vision for law requires us to look at what judges were being asked to do and the 
understanding of a volkish legal system demonstrated by those who were asking them to do 
it.
30
       
3. Mystic, Volkish Nazism and its Concept of Law 
3.a. Mystic, Volkish, Nazism 
In 1941, Baynes translated and compiled a collection of Hitler’s speeches.  In doing so, he 
made the following observation: 
[I]t is no easy thing for an Englishman to state the National Socialist theory of law, for 
its basis is fundamentally mystical: law rises like a well-spring from the consciousness 
of the German people, from the people’s soul...
31
   
The origins of National Socialism go back centuries, its influences further still.  These 
roots are multifarious. It is a point of debate as to whether Nazism really ought to be afforded 
the term ‘ideology’, given its internal inconsistencies.32  Baynes alludes to what is often 
referred to as the ‘mystic’ side of the Nazi movement.  This aspect was pervasive and it grew 
                                                          
29
 Bundesarchiv Berlin BAB R 22/3370, English translation by Noakes (n 13) 154-155.  Nazi criticisms of the 
legal system display inabilities to understand basic concepts.  In this respect, Hitler’s private conversations or 
Table Talk (n 21), are illuminating.  See his failure to grasp the need for a document to be witnessed on 29
th
 
March, 1942, ibid 375, or the idea of criminal defence, ibid 585-586. 
30
 I do not deny the possibility of legalized evil, nor do I suggest that the ‘last vestiges of law were destroyed by 
1940’, the claims that David Fraser argues against in Law after Auschwitz: Towards a Jurisprudence of the 
Holocaust (Carolina Academic Press, 2005) 42, 79.  
31
 Speeches (n 8) 513, see also Lawrence Preuss ‘Germanic Law Versus Roman Law in National Socialist Legal 
Theory’ (1934) 16(4) Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 269. Nazism claimed scientific 
bases, but the central tenets are preposterous – see Preuss’ explanation of the notion that ‘mystical’ German law 
is passed down through the blood, ibid, 269-273. Lowenstein, a German émigré, also noted the anti-rationalist, 
anti-scientific roots of Nazi law, (n 14) 779-780. 
32 See Georg Lukács The Destruction of Reason (Peter Palmer tr, Merlin Press, 1980). Private correspondence 
among senior Nazis and some statements in Mein Kampf reveal that they would use any argument to achieve 
their ends, ibid 720-733, 740-741.  This issue outside the scope of our investigation. For a summary of debates 
see Karl Dietrich Bracher The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure and Consequences of National 
Socialism (Jean Steinberg tr, Praeger, 1985) 15-66, 72-80. 
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in influence throughout the twelve years in which National Socialism remained in power.  By 
the time the war ended, Nazi senior command was largely made up of individuals that were 
sympathetic to this side of the movement.  Most notable among these were Heinrich 
Himmler, Alfred Rosenberg, and Adolf Hitler himself.  The war-era writings of Nazism’s 
most acclaimed philosophers, Martin Heidegger and Carl Schmitt, broadly belonged within 
this side of the movement.
33
 The only vociferous ‘anti-mystic’ in Nazi senior leadership was 
Ernst Röhm.  There would be none after his execution in 1934.
34
 It would be wrong to claim 
that Rohm’s anti-mysticism was the reason for his execution, but a ‘mystic’, volkish form of 
Nazism was either endorsed or accepted by Nazi leadership from that point onwards. We 
cannot fully understand the direction in which Nazism was moving, and thus understand 
Nazism’s unrealised Nazi concept of law, without an appreciation of this strand within 
Nazism. This is the main point that Baynes’ is making; it is a claim supported by the 
voluminous German literature on this subject, not least the works of Bernd Rüthers and H. W. 
Koch.
35
 
Mystic Nazism is rooted in the volkish movement; this, in turn, largely grew out of the 
romantic anti-rationalist movements and philosophy of the nineteenth century.
36
 Its rise as a 
movement has echoes in contemporary Europe and North America.  At the start of the twenty 
first century, the forces of globalisation left many behind socially and economically, creating 
                                                          
33
 See Carl Schmitt On the Three Types of Juristic Thought (Joseph W. Bendersky tr, Praeger, 2004) 15 We will 
only discuss Schmitt’s most ‘pro-Nazi’ works for the purposes of this essay.  Schmitt’s relationship with the 
Nazi movement was complex, but ultimately damning, see Bernd Rüthers Carl Schmitt im Dritten Reich (CH 
Beck, 1990) Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (Oxford University 
Press, 1944). A more sympathetic reading is provided by Joseph Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the 
Reich (Princeton University Press, 1983). For an argument that the dominant ‘legal philosophy’ within the 
existing system was Heidegger-inspired see Ian Ward Law, Philosophy and National Socialism (Peter Lang AG, 
1992).   
34
 See Joachim Fest, The Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leadership (Michael Bullock tr, Da 
Capo, 1999) 136-150.  The motivation behind ‘The Night of the Long Knives’ remains a contested issue, we are 
reliant on highly propagandist sources, see Eleanor Hancock ‘The Purge of the SA Reconsidered: “An Old 
Putschist trick?”’ (2011) 44 (4) Central European History 669. 
35
 Bernd Rüthers, Entartetes Recht: Rechtslehren und Kronjuristen im Dritten Reich (C. H. Beck., 1988), 1-30 
36
 See generally George Mosse The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich 
(Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966) 13-30, Nazi ‘youth movements’ were very volkish, ibid 193 
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a vacuum for the far right in contemporary democracies.  Similarly, at the start of the 
twentieth century, the forces of rationalism and modernity left those wedded to a more 
traditional lifestyle behind.  The volkish movement grew out of a reaction to such forces. It 
sought to preserve traditional ways of life. This was said to be a ‘spiritual’ movement.  
Rationalism and modernity saw nature as a ‘calculable coherence of forces’, in the words of 
Heidegger, a ‘standing reserve’ 37  in the service to ‘doing and making’ 38 .The volkish 
movement sought to reunite German people with their ‘soil’, to become more at one with 
nature.  There was merit in a traditional life that was more in harmony with one’s 
surroundings, but this was not reducible to any finite, tangible, resource.  It was a spiritual 
benefit. Much of the volkish movement’s activities centred on the organization of various 
‘robust’ outdoor pursuits, particularly among the young. For example, the various ‘youth 
movements’ of the Nazi era grew out of the volkish tradition. 
None of this, by itself, would lead one towards a far-right political position. Nevertheless, it 
requires no great leap of the imagination to see how the existence of volkish ideas more 
generally in the culture might be politicized in a far-right direction.  If one is committed to 
the idea that the ‘true German’ has a spiritual connection to the soil of the country, then 
outsiders simply do not have this connection; they do not belong spiritually. For this faction 
within Nazism, Jews had no connection to any soil.  As such, the Jew was spiritually lacking 
and thus not fully human, according to the outlook of people like Alfred Rosenberg.
39
 Among 
other roles, Rosenberg was ‘Commissar for Supervision of Intellectual and Ideological 
Education of the NSDAP’. The volkish movement wished to replace increasing reliance on 
                                                          
37
 Martin Heidegger The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, (William Lovitt, tr, Harper & 
Row, 1977) 23-24 
38
 Martin Heidegger Letter on Humanism reproduced in full in David Farrell Krell (ed), Basic Writings: Martin 
Heidegger (Routledge, 1996), 217-265, 218 
39
 See Alfred Rosenberg, ‘The Earth Centred Jew Lacks a Soul’ in George Mosse (ed) Nazi Culture: 
Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich (Salvator Attanasio et al. trs, W.H. Allen, 1966) 75-79.  
Mosse explains how Nazism made this aspect of volkish and ‘new romantic’ movements the focal point, Mosse 
(n 36) 294-311.  Not every volkish philosopher supported Nazism; see discussion of Kurt Huber in Yvonne 
Sherratt Hitler’s Philosophers (Yale University Press, 2013) 207-228 
13 
 
science with spiritual ‘authenticity’, a key theme throughout Heidegger’s work. 40  In the 
political sphere, this was became a distrust of ‘materialism’, capitalist and communist. 
Nazism’s ‘German Revolution’ described itself as an alternative to liberal democracy and 
Marxist socialism.  This ‘third way’ was a revival of medieval concepts.  Arthur Moeller van 
den Bruck (who coined the phrase ‘The Third Reich’) most clearly articulated this notion.  He 
died in 1925, but his work influenced Nazism and similar ‘young conservative’ movements 
of the time
41
. For those who came to Nazism via a volkish ethos, the movement was a 
spiritual quest wherein the German volk would fulfil its destiny. There was a readymade 
association between German identity, a robust, outdoor lifestyle, and ‘health’ in contrast to 
the increasingly indoors, multiracial, urban lifestyles.  As Hitler put it to Himmler in a 
conversation about public service, ‘what kind of role can a nation play when it is governed by 
people who weigh and analyse everything? I need rough, courageous people’.42 Mystics even 
tried to establish a uniquely ‘Germanic [Christian] faith’.43   
The notion of the volk, “true” Germans, defined by a spiritual connection to the very soil of 
Germany would be invaluable to Nazism. It allowed for a public that would be more 
receptive to many of Nazism’s core ideas, especially when combined with at least some pre-
existing anti-Semitism and crude, popular, understandings of genetics and race.  Lengthy 
(and costly) efforts to establish the notion of a pure German race through de rigeur fields of 
study such as genetics and anthropology failed.
44
 The notion of a volk allowed Nazism to 
perpetuate the idea of Germanic ‘purity’ in ways that were not hostage to the latest advances 
                                                          
40
 See Mosse (n 36) 64-66 and Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, trs, 
Basil Blackwell, 1980), 304-382. For more on Heidegger’s commitment to Nazism and how it influenced his 
work see Emmanuel Faye Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy (Michael Smith tr, Yale 
University Press, 2009).  
41
 Das Dritte Reich (Allen and Unwin, 1934) 
42
 Conversation of 2
nd
 November, 1941, Table Talk (n 21) 108 
43
 Mosse (n 36) 31-51, see also Fritz Stern The Politics of Cultural Despair (University of California Press, 
1961). 
44
 See Eric Ehrenreich The Nazi Ancestral Proof: Genealogy, Racial Science and the Final Solution (Indiana 
University Press, 2007) and Hans-Walter Schmuhl The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human 
Heredity and Eugenics 1927-1945 (Springer, 2008) 117-400. 
14 
 
in science and medicine. In various speeches Hitler referred to the volk as the foundation of 
his authority and that of the state.
45
  Mein Kampf is replete with references to the ‘volkischer 
Staat’ or volk state.46  The Führer principle itself was ‘mystical’, based on a national ‘spirit’, 
embodied in the Führer.
47
  This allowed Hitler to claim democratic support with an 
“overwhelming majority” in his proclamation at the Nuremberg Parteitag of September 
1934, in spite of the fact that the party never won a majority vote in a democratic election.
48
  
Power was consolidated by the extension of emergency powers.  Yet the supposed threat was 
an ‘internal enemy’, the notion of which was also ‘spiritual’ and never defined.  There was 
thus no need to provide physical evidence of a threat from organized groups such as mass 
civil protest or persistent physical attacks against authorities, neither of which existed.
49
 
Volkish spirit was distinguished from measurable, popular opinion, so the Führer could act 
contrary to the express views of the majority and still claim to have authority emanating from 
the people.  It allowed Carl Schmitt to claim that Hitler had won a ‘popular referendum’ on 
who should lead.
50
  As the definition was spiritual, conversion to Judaism rendered an 
individual just as ‘Jewish’ as any other, a vital component given the number of German Jews 
who had converted in the 1700s.
51
 The notion of ‘volk’ enabled Nazis to exclude political 
enemies and dissenters on the basis that they were not true Germans, regardless of their 
genetic make-up, appearance or where they were born.
52
  Conversely, it allowed them to 
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disregard ‘volkish traits’ displayed by Jews as ‘mimicry’ of Aryans; Jews like Spinoza and 
Einstein were said by some to be not really (that is, spiritually) Jewish.
53
  This got Nazism 
out of another bind. Jewish ‘mimicry’ offered an excuse volk who had married Jews or 
mischlinge without realizing it, and thereby breached laws against miscegenation.
54
 Dangers 
to the economy presented by ‘The Jew’ required no concrete, real proof as the dangers were 
‘spiritual’, and ‘ethical’.55  It justified land confiscation on the basis that ‘The Jew’ had no 
spiritual connection to the soil, seeing it merely as a resource for exploitation; Heidegger 
decried this attitude as ‘technological’.56 As Stolleis notes, even where elements of Weimar 
land law were preserved, the notion of the ‘common good’ allowed for a broad interpretative 
approach by the judiciary, which invariably prejudiced minority groups.
57
 Since ‘state’, 
‘individual’ and ‘community’ made up a spiritual union, the notion of different public and 
private spheres disappeared as did the idea of individual rights against that state.
58
 It allowed 
the Nazis to claim that ‘mental characteristics’ were hereditary, in spite of clear evidence to 
the contrary, and thus compulsorily sterilize, work to death, or exterminate not only Jews but 
alcoholics, the disabled, and many others.
59
  
In the above ways, and many more, the volkish influence in Nazism facilitated what Adorno 
referred to as “the jargon of authenticity”.60  By invoking the notion of a spiritual or inner 
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truth, Nazism appealed to something that could not be verified through observation.  Stolleis 
notes how this vagueness allowed Nazism to achieve many of its early goals, through law; the 
notion of the volksgemeinschaft as the ultimate justification for all law allowed for sweeping 
reforms in labour and tax law on the basis of this single, nebulous, appeal.
61
 Nazism twisted 
the meanings of various terms - “science”, “threat”, “race”, “democracy” – so that they meant 
something very different from conventional understandings.  A similar appeal to a spiritual 
basis was made when it came to reform of the legal system.  As we will see, the volkish 
concept of law that guided these reforms was utterly distinct from the concept under debate 
between Fuller and Hart. 
3.b. Towards a Volkish Nazi Legal System 
As with their claims about global Jewish economic conspiracies or links between Nordic 
races and great empires of the past, National Socialist theories of law lack specifics.  
Rosenberg’s Myth of the Twentieth Century contains an entire chapter on ‘Nordic German 
Law’.  He distinguishes Nordic law from Roman, Jewish, Marxist or liberal conceptions, 
each of which is criticised.  ‘True German law’ is said to be based on a sense of ‘honour’, 
stemming from the pure German heart.
62
  But there is little detail beyond this.  Similarly, 
Schmitt’s focus during his Nazi era writings, was to criticise ‘liberal’ and ‘anti-German’ 
regard for due process and fact. In a move typical of Nazi ‘jargon’ there was virtually no 
positive explanation.  Schmitt only hints at how judges ought to act - a judge should not be 
‘spiritually hapless’ and should ‘emotionally grasp the political sense of...juridical 
demands’.63 Mysticism was also central to the removal of competing ideas from academia.  In 
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the early 20th Century German constitutional theory considered itself a ‘science’.  ‘Anti-
scientism’ allowed Nazism to remove or undermine those that wished to preserve traditional 
legal concepts in academia.  As Stolleis put it in this context, ‘a science that proves utterly 
adaptable and malleable must develop doubts about its own character as a science’.64  Legal 
scientists argued that the Rechtsstaat of the Weimar period (and hence rule of law) remained 
in operation in the Nazi era.  By 1938 they had given up.
65
  From then on, Nazi legal 
scholarship was avowedly anti-rationalist.
66
 
The idea of ‘volk’ provides the most obvious point of entry for mysticism into substantive 
law.  As Schmitt put it ‘[a]ll law stems from the volk’s right to exist.  Every legal statute, 
every judicial decision only contains justice insofar as it flows from this source...’ 67  
Similarly, Rosenberg claimed that ‘justice is that which Aryan men hold to be right’.68  
Protecting and preserving the ‘volk’ was thought of spiritually; all of the laws against racial 
admixture, promoting racial purity and disenfranchising non-Aryans from civic life were at 
least influenced this outlook.
69
  The same preservation of the volk was used to deprive Jews 
and Poles of legal protection in 1941; Freisler claimed that ‘harshness against the enemy of 
the volk means the well-being of the volk”.70 Yet Nazi mysticism had a pervasive impact on 
the legal system, way beyond the racial laws, even if the ultimate vision of a mystic Nazi 
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system was never fully realized.  As Rüthers has charted, this meant that Nazi reform of law 
could impact areas of private law without the legislative changes that were required in public 
and criminal law.
71
   
A key feature of reform was the notion that ‘Roman-Jewish Law’ had corrupted 
‘German Common Law’.  The former was to be removed in favour of the latter since Roman 
Law was too based in ‘reason’ and not enough in ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’72; ‘true law’ could only be 
produced by the inner-feelings of ‘Aryan, Nordic men’.73  In reality, the systems had become 
so fused that it may have been impossible to identify which elements had their roots in 
Roman Law and which in German Common Law.
74
  It is a moot point as no such task was 
attempted. Just as Nazi claims about race were dubious scientifically, even at the time, Nazi 
claims about traditional, German culture were dubious historically.  Their main source was 
Tacitus’ Germania; a work that must be read with some scepticism. Its author probably never 
set foot in Germany and may have had political reasons for exaggerating the strength and 
unity of the “Germans outside Rome”.  Even then, less flattering aspects of Tacitus’ 
ethnography (supposed tendencies towards drunkenness and laziness) were ignored.
75
 The 
distinction was used as an excuse for the removal of rules, principles and legislation if and 
when these obstructed Nazi goals, with no identifiable pattern beyond this.
76
 Equally dubious 
was the claim that this was the revival of an ancient Germanic peasant model. Nazi ‘loyalty’ 
to the Führer bore little relation to Treue um Treue (‘loyalty for loyalty’), which was 
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reciprocal.
77
  But in many respects, seeking historical accuracy is to miss the point.  The 
underlying premise in the volkish, mystic side of Nazism was that we should be less 
concerned with empirically verifiable fact and should focus more on ‘spirit’ and sentiment. 
Our difficulty in pinning down the meaning of “law” in a volkish sense is thus not accidental.  
As with much in volkish philosophy more generally, true German Law was supposed to defy 
definition. Indeed it is one of the very features of the volkish or mystic strands within Nazism 
that precise definition is impossible; the spiritually authentic will intuitively ‘feel’ the 
concept.  The rest of us will not. Heidegger repeatedly claimed that ‘true thinking’, with 
which he was hoping to replace ‘philosophy’, could not be captured in writing.78  We see the 
same notion in Nazi legal and political philosophy.  Only the volk could grasp ‘true German 
law’ and they do so instinctively or intuitively. I am not a member of the volk, so I am not 
supposed to understand true German Law, much less articulate it.  The same is true of both 
Fuller and Hart.
79
 Nevertheless, we can see two, clear, substantive changes that mystic 
Nazism sought in relation to the administration of justice.  The first relates to rule-following, 
the second to fact-finding.  These two aspects are enough for us to see how the Nazi concept 
of law falls entirely outside the Fuller/Hart paradigm and legal philosophy that remains 
within it. 
3.b.i Normativity 
Nazism was influenced by the ‘bund’ leadership model, used throughout the volkish 
movement.
80
  Combined with the crude social Darwinism of writers such as Hermann Graf 
Keyserling, this paved the way for the introduction of the Führerprinzip or ‘Führer 
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principle’.81  The bund was a medieval, spiritual union.  It was believed that a ‘heroic’ leader 
would naturally emerge from the group. This leader would epitomize a common set of 
intuitions or feelings.
82
  Nazi reform of the judiciary aimed to follow this model.  Judicial 
independence, a ‘liberal’, ‘Bolshevik’, ‘Roman’ or ‘Jewish’ idea, was to be eliminated.  The 
judge was to become a civil servant in all but name.  Crucially, however, the administration 
of Nazi ‘justice’ did not take the form of rules.  Judges were to decide according to ‘national 
socialist spirit’.  The system under construction was expressly non-normative in 
contradistinction to what Schmitt described as ‘existentially normative’ ‘Jewish’ law.83  This 
was so in two ways.   
First, Nazi reforms installed committed Nazi judges instead of generating new rules for 
judges to follow. The bund model was not based upon a series of top-down orders; bundish 
conceptions of state saw it as a spiritual guide rather than an order-issuing authority.
84
  
Similarly, there was to be ‘no reform of justice, but a reform of jurists’.85 The judge was ‘not 
bound by instructions’ so that he could ‘fulfil his task in the racial community’.86  
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Senior command, including Thierack, felt that judges should be so spiritually connected to 
the volk that they could give expression to ‘inner’ German law without direction.  For his 
part, Hitler remarked to Thierack, Lammers, and Rothenberger his ideal system would 
eliminate the need for legislation altogether.
87
 This ethos is seen in the decree of June 28, 
1935, which introduced ‘punishment by analogy’.  It allowed judges to convict and sentence 
on the basis of acts that were not prohibited, but nonetheless ‘deserved of punishment 
according to...the sound perception of the people’.88    
Second, judges were to ignore specific legal rules if they went against ‘volkish spirit’, 
epitomized by state and party.  ‘Observance of forms’ was to take a backseat to ‘the measure 
in which [one] defends volkish life’ as Hitler indicated in his closing speech to the 
Nuremberg Parteitag of 1935.
89
 As Goebbels put it, judges ‘should proceed less from the law 
than from the basic idea that the offender was to be eliminated’.90  The wording of laws 
mattered less and less as the regime consolidated power.
91
  Consistency from one case to 
another was no concern.
92
  There was no need for policy and judgments to display internal 
logic; while racially, pre-determined character traits were a cornerstone of Nazi ideology, the 
courts still found legal culpability for having such traits.  So, for example, The Schoenberg 
Petty Court evicted a Jewish tenant on the grounds of his ‘racial qualities’ on the basis that he 
is ‘at fault’ for being a ‘foreign body’, while accepting that ‘the fact that the tenant is a Jew 
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does not mean that he is himself at fault in the normal sense’.93 Civilians could be charged 
under military law.
94
 As a result, any remark made in private was potentially a ‘public 
attempt to...undermine the will of the German...nation’.95 This is exemplified by the ‘Grudge 
informer case’ discussed by Fuller and Hart. 96  Many lower courts still felt a sense of 
obligation to the letter of legislation and established principle, but this mattered little as 
volkish mysticism in superior courts invariably overturned any first instance normative 
approach.
97
  In a typical example, the Special Court in Breslau found a defendant guilty of a 
‘violent act committed with a firearm’, on appeal, in a decision of 23rd April 1941. The 
defendant had punched the victim with his fists, using no weapon.
98
     
‘Spirit’ was to be given such priority over ‘letter’ in Hitler’s vision for law, that citizens 
might be prosecuted for following or enforcing prescribed rules.
99
  Appeal to specific 
legislative wording was derided as a ‘Jewish and liberalistic moral and legal mentality’.100 In 
place of rule-following, the bund model for the administration of justice was based on shared 
spirit and common intuition.  The role of judge, in Nazi legal philosophy, was to give effect 
to the ‘common sense of the people’ exercising ‘healthy prejudice’.  He was to avoid 
‘rationalistic dissection of facts’, in favour of ‘essential [i.e. spiritual] truth’ and the will of 
his racial community.
101
 To accept a volkish, Nazi concept of law, then, is to accept the 
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possibility of a non-normative (or minimally normative) legal system.  We will return to this 
issue in section four. 
3.b.ii Facts 
This ‘mystic’ basis had another important consequence for how Nazism viewed judicial 
decision-making.  The facts of a case were subordinate to the interests of state, movement 
and volk.
102
 This mirrors the Nazi attitude towards both historical accuracy and scientific 
evidence.  The same worldview lead Nazism to glorify racist pseudo-scientists like Lagarde 
precisely because of his ‘rejection of things as they are’ in favour of the ‘projection of 
will’103 .  The same mindset prompted the Bavarian State Minister for Education to tell 
Munich professors, ‘From now on the question for you is not to determine whether something 
is true, but to determine whether it is in the spirit of National Socialism’.104 ‘Materialism’, a 
term used by Nazism to mean desire for material proof, was considered a Jewish trait, the 
result of lack in spirituality.
105
   
Similarly, Nazi judges were encouraged to decide cases on the basis of personality ‘types’ of 
the parties involved rather than the facts at hand.
106
 Goebbels instructed judges of the 
People’s Court that ‘[t]he idea that the judge must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt must 
be discarded completely’.107  Thierack gave similar direction on sentencing.108  The best 
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known example of this approach concerned labourers from the ‘Eastern Provinces’, forced to 
work inside Germany.  Such workers often attempted escape into Switzerland.  Many were 
executed on the basis that their flight was to join ‘guerrilla forces’. In fact, virtually all had 
fled in order to avoid harsh working conditions and nothing more.  During the Nuremberg 
trials it emerged that their prosecutors had been fully aware of this fact.
109
  Another clear 
illustration of this volkish attitude towards fact in Nazi law reform can be seen in the various 
laws against defeatism – even as the war was clearly unwinnable for Germany, it was a crime 
to say so.
110
  After Hitler had taken his own life, it was (supposedly) criminal to report his 
demise. For the same reason; in the trial of General Hoepner, Freisler asked the defendant 
‘who gave you the right to know that the Führer was dead?’111 
Even the express decisions of the court were not what they appeared.  One of Thierack’s first 
acts in 1942 was to oversee an agreement that Gestapo could ‘correct’ any punishment 
considered too lenient by both he and Himmler.
112
  A later decree, 20 July 1944, allowed the 
Ministry of Justice to circumvent courts entirely and submit cases directly to the Führer, if it 
felt that a trial was ‘unnecessary’.  This decree, BDC, NG-646 was unpublished, but no less 
‘binding’.113  All of this was introduced in spite of collusion between the Gestapo and the 
judiciary throughout the regime.
114
  Gestapo also re-arrested those found innocent in court. 
Protective custody, for an indefinite time, pending a trial that in all likelihood would never 
take place, was outside of the remit of the judiciary. Later, re-arrest became a practice of 
internment in concentration camps.  Most state deprivation of liberty thus became the 
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responsibility of police rather than judiciary.  The punishment of the court may or may not 
have been the punishment in fact.  A finding of innocence was meaningless; in all likelihood, 
the defendant would be treated as guilty.
115
 State, movement and volk were a spiritual union, 
so one could not challenge this authority without challenging oneself.  A verdict of ‘innocent’ 
simply meant that the accused was worked to death instead of executed, if this was the 
outcome sought by the Gestapo.  Furthermore, judicial decisions were hostage to ‘correction’ 
by direct intervention from Hitler or Thierack.  In a further illustration of how little the 
regime cared for fact-finding, it appears that Hitler never read the judgements that he 
overturned.  Instead, intervention was based on brief, sensationalized media accounts of both 
facts and trial.
116
 
Crucially for the discussion at hand, we must recall that Nazi senior leadership was far from 
pleased at how far the legal system had moved towards its ideal.  Helmut Nicolai, author of 
The Doctrine of Racial Laws and the principle architect of this aspect of Nazi law reform, 
was forced out of party in 1935 on the basis of his espousal of rule of law. Freisler may have 
discouraged decisions made on the basis of ‘rules and regulations’ and ‘formalistic rigidity’ 
in favour of ‘a living and dynamic attitude’ and ‘unconditional faith’, yet Hitler privately 
described him as a ‘nothing but a Bolshevik’117. Schmitt may have railed against ‘liberal’, 
‘democratic’ law in favour of the volkish state and non-normative German law, but he too fell 
out of favour with the senior administration for being too ‘liberal’ and ‘legalistic’.   Perhaps 
most surprisingly, even Thierack was said to be ‘too in thrall to [pre-existing] law’.  As 
discussed, Thierack agitated for constant reformation of the judiciary and conceded vast 
amounts of power to the Gestapo. In addition he arranged a secret deal with Himmler to keep 
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law out of the eastern territories.
118
 Thierack even described the judicial role as ‘immediate 
vassals of the Führer and aides of the political leadership’119.  Lowenstein’s prediction in 
1936, that National Socialism’s anti-rational experiment would end and German law fall back 
into a combination of mysticism and rationality was wrong.  Even as the war ended, the 
system was not mystic enough for Nazism.
120
  To imagine the volkish Nazi concept of law in 
action is to imagine a system that places even less emphasis upon prescribed rules and even 
more on ‘spirit’.  It is to imagine a system that placed even less faith on the notion of 
empirically verifiable fact and even more on intuition.  
 
 
4. The Fuller/Hart Paradigm 
We are now in a position to consider how this vague, mystic, Nazi concept of law might fit 
within the Hart/Fuller paradigm.  In doing so, we will be mindful of a suggestion that Hart 
made.  Instead of trying to lay down fundamental features that must be present before we are 
willing to afford the name “law” to a particular system, let us consider instead the notion that 
we might say of a particularly wicked system that “no such system has existed or could 
endure”.  We see, with few complications, that neither Hart nor Fuller imagined that a system 
such as that under construction by volkish Nazism “could long endure”. Even the loose 
outline features of volkish Nazi law fall outside the very basic assumptions that Hart and 
Fuller make about “law”.  From a comparative and historical perspective, this prompts us to 
consider whether such a system has existed in the past. If this could be shown to be the case, 
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then the Hart/Fuller concept is very narrow indeed. As such, it would be of little use when we 
try to contemplate whether “law” is compatible with great moral evil as it would exclude a 
great many concepts of law (both real and hypothetical) from the very start. A version of this 
argument has been made in some recent literature; in what follows I will offer a response.  
The volkish Nazi understanding of law appears to be the historical outlier, not that of Fuller 
and Hart. 
 
4.a. Normativity 
It is common ground between Hart and Fuller that ‘the foundation of a legal system 
is... [f]undamental accepted rules specifying the essential law making procedures’121.  The 
assumption that law is about rule-making and rule-following is also seen in critical responses 
to that debate.
122
 Of course, it is imperative that both comparative lawyers and jurisprudents 
should avoid the trap of assuming that ‘law’ as a concept is exhausted by twentieth century 
Anglo-American paradigms such as that of the debate between Fuller and Hart. But even 
where we resist the temptation to equate ‘law’ with ‘state-created normative order’, it is hard 
to escape the notion that any system of social order we would identify as ‘law’ is at least 
somewhat normative.
123
  The ultimate vision of Rosenberg, Schmitt, Thierack, and Freisler 
was not what Fuller or Hart had in mind, whatever about the system that actually was in force 
during the Second World War. It is not even a ‘gunman situation writ large’, unless the 
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gunman is a deranged, double-crossing variety that may or may not still shoot his hapless 
victim after the money has been handed over.
124
  Even if we lower the normative requirement 
to something like the consistent application of general principles, this Nazi vision would fail. 
The need for consistency between cases was also seen as alien to ‘true German law’. Ronald 
Dworkin suggested that his notion of law as ‘interpretive’ might allow us to accept wicked 
systems such as that in Nazi Germany as ‘law’ (in a pre-interpretive sense), while also 
claiming that Nazi law was not law in a ‘full’ sense (that is, interpretatively). Here, we are 
concerned with the unrealised Nazi concept of law.  In Dworkin’s terms, it seems likely that 
this is not law even in a pre-interpretive sense; there are no ‘rules and standards’ to provide a 
‘tentative content of the practice’.125   
We must be careful, however, to avoid a false dichotomy. Volkish, Nazi, conceptions 
of law may have been expressly non-normative, but there is a big difference between a 
system that has no rules at all, and one that is only minimally rule-based.  Since Hart and 
Fuller never debated exactly how normative a legal system would have to be to count as 
‘normative enough’, we cannot say, for certain, where that tipping point lies within their 
shared assumptions about law.  Perhaps it is not beyond imagination that Hart might be 
willing to grant the name ‘law’ to a system for dispute resolution that is normative only in a 
very crude and basic sense.  In spite of anti-normative rhetoric, the Bund model involved at 
least one norm - ‘what the Führer says, goes’.  This is not far off the account that Rüthers 
provides of judicial interpretation in the relevant era; the judiciary was encouraged to 
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interpret the words of the Führer literally, but all other areas of law loosely and in light of the 
Führer’s will.126 Hart was willing to call this “law”; for Rüthers this was Entartetes Recht or 
“degenerated law”. Had the Reich lasted another thousand years, it seems likely that it would 
have had to remain at least this normative; it is a conditio sine qua non of authoritarianism. 
Hypothetically, an elder in a small, close-knit community, might resolve disputes in this way 
without express rules or a sense of being bound by past decisions.  This elder may be good or 
evil, fair or unfair, wise or foolish.  Those of us subject to this ‘lawgiver’ would find it hard 
to arrange social affairs.  It is difficult to imagine such a system expanding to anything like a 
state level yet remaining effective. Furthermore, even the most basic legal systems that we 
know about have much more regard for due process and are far more normative than the Nazi 
concept.
127
 Nevertheless, Hart (if not Fuller) may still be willing to say of such a 
(hypothetical) community that it has a concept of ‘law’, provided that the elder in question 
affords priority to the notion that her judgements are dependent on the facts of the matter at 
hand, facts which may contradict her initial intuitions.
128
  There may be no identifiable, 
prescribed rules or even a ‘custom’ beyond the notion that this one individual is in charge. 
But there is at least a fetter on the power that this elder can wield; she is still be bound by 
something. In a very loose sense, then, we might be willing to say that such a community has 
‘rule of law’, albeit that its features are very different to our normal understandings.  Let us 
assume, for the moment, that the issue of whether to call this ‘law’ falls within the parameters 
of disagreement between Fuller and Hart.  There is a more fundamental reason to doubt that 
the Nazi concept cannot be afforded the name ‘law’ at all under the basic assumptions made 
by both Fuller and Hart. 
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4.b. Facts  
In the minimally normative, tribal system that we considered in the previous section, 
imagine if the elder charged with dispute resolution did not care about fact – if there were 
nothing that could, even hypothetically, count as evidence against her initial instinct.  There 
may be that single norm “what the lawgiver says, goes”, but this time, even if I have 
demonstrable evidence that I followed the will of the lawgiver, I will still be punished if the 
lawgiver wills it.  
Some may accept this is an example of ‘law’. Such a position cannot distinguish ‘law’ 
from ‘power’ conceptually – one is just a sub-category of the other. Some contemporary 
positions in Anglo-American legal philosophy hold this very position – “law” is the exercise 
of unfettered power, dressed up in the language of reason and rationality.
129
 If one holds such 
an understanding of law as a concept, then it tells us nothing to discover that unfettered and 
arbitrary power facilitates the worst forms of oppression and immorality.  Of course it does.  
This option is open to neither Fuller nor Hart. Their subject matter, their concept of ‘law’, 
was distinct from unfettered and arbitrary power.
130
  For them, it was both meaningful and 
worthwhile to question the possibility of a ‘wicked regime’ and the relationship between ‘law 
and morality’. For both Fuller and Hart a sense of fidelity to law was an important part of the 
concept. We show this fidelity through our actions.  There is nothing to which one could 
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show fidelity if the facts of ones actions (what one did or did not do) do not matter in the eyes 
of the so-called ‘legal system’. 
It is thus implicit in the Fuller and Hart concept of law that facts matter in legal 
decision-making and that the very concept of law involves a central concern with fact.  
Although Hart never articulated this underlying assumption, it is a recurring theme in his 
work that law cannot help but reflect ‘obvious truisms about human nature and the world we 
live’.131  It is only by making such a commitment that Fuller and Hart can retain their 
distinction between law and arbitrary power, make their claims about the centrality of fidelity 
to law, and take seriously the question of ‘great evil written into law’.  The same is true of the 
entire jurisprudential tradition that has followed these writers and, one suspects, a great deal 
of other concepts of law too.  This conclusion means one of two things.  Either the 
Fuller/Hart concept of law is fundamentally flawed because it assumes a feature that is absent 
in legal systems, or the volkish Nazi concept of law, one that sees facts as trivial is a genuine 
outlier.  Volkish Nazism may have had in mind a concept referred to as ‘law’, but this is yet 
another example of what Adorno called ‘jargon’, a word used in a way that twists the 
meaning to something that is utterly different from the manner in which it is used elsewhere.  
To this end, we can recall Hart’s notion of a starting point for this sort of analysis; ‘no such 
legal system has existed or could endure’.  Of course, one could not hope to survey all legal 
systems within a lifetime, let alone within a single essay.  Instead, let us go straight to the 
heart of the matter.  We will look first, briefly, at a weak form of this argument, specifically 
the suggestion that legal systems unlike our own are often far more ‘mystic’.  We will then 
examine various versions of a stronger form, that is, the argument that the legal systems 
Fuller and Hart took as their starting point, those of the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America, are not so dissimilar to the Nazi system in their treatment of fact.   
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5. ‘No such system has ever existed’?  
If we take it that any meaningful concept of law must place some priority on the 
notion of empirically verifiable facts about which our intuitions might be wrong, this raises 
an obvious issue.  It seems likely that every legal culture has failed to afford due priority to 
fact to at least some extent and at some point in its history (probably even now).  One might 
object that if we are to deny the name ‘law’ to any system that prioritizes intuition and 
prejudice over fact, there would be no system worthy of the name. That the volkish concept of 
law falls outside that of Fuller and Hart might tell us that their debate is entirely 
wrongheaded, in this scenario.  There are several possible variations on this point, some of 
which have been employed by writers like David Fraser to claim that the Nazi legal system 
was just as ‘legal’ as ours. I shall now deal with a number of the more important of these 
objections. 
First, other societies may have placed more stock in superstition, faith or intuition.  If 
we discount the Nazi ‘concept of law’ on the basis of its hostility to empirically verifiable 
fact, one might suggest that we must also reject the notion that these societies had a concept 
of law.   
This suggestion is based on a false analogy.  These sorts of legal systems do not (or 
did not) ignore available evidence in the manner of Nazism.  There are various examples of 
expressly ‘anti-enlightenment’ language within Nazi writings 132 ; in his diaries, Victor 
Klemperer noted that “the regime sees education, scholarship, enlightenment as its real 
enemies and attacks them accordingly”.133  Others, such as Adorno and Horkenheimer have 
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argued instead that “reversion to mythology” is inherent in post-enlightenment thinking.134 
The forces of modernity did play an important role in creating the environment in which 
Nazism was able to attain power.  Detlev Peukert argues that several elements of crisis, 
combined with the failure of the Weimar Republic as a first experiment in modern 
democracy, lead to the rise of Nazism – modernity created an environment for reactionary 
forces to grow, question and ultimately attack it.
135
 Yet this debate is slightly off our topic. 
Nazism’s overt hostility to empirically verifiable fact, rational explanation, and causality is 
hostility to something far older. Few contemporary legal systems adhere to a ‘spiritual’ 
notion of adjudication that we have seen in the volkish concept of law.  Such systems may 
have existed in the past.  These appeals to spirituality in decision-making seem irrational 
now.  But these appeals were typically efforts to explain facts about the physical world in the 
absence of anything better and available.  For example, trial by ordeal may seem utterly 
irrational to readers. Yet in many ancient cultures it was considered a judgment of the 
relevant god.  As such it was premised on the notion that the world is the product of divine 
intervention. In Ugaritic civilizations, for example, efforts to explain why some people 
drowned at sea in accidents and others survived led to the conclusion that ‘Yam’ was both the 
river-god and the judge-god.  Those that drowned were being punished.  It was no huge leap, 
therefore, to conclude that Yam would spare the innocent and drown the wicked if there was 
no human way of determining guilt or innocence.
136
   Such a basis is demonstrably false now, 
but the practice fit with available evidence in Ugaritic cultures for explaining how things are.  
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Ordeal was also typically used as a last resort, that is, in the absence of evidence and where 
there are competing and credible accounts of the relevant facts.
137
  On the mystic, Nazi 
‘concept of law’, intuition was to be preferred to evidence.  There was also a genuine 
possibility that a trial by ordeal could produce either result – an individual could point to 
something considered ‘proof’ in order to establish guilt or innocence.138  No such possibility 
existed in the ‘spiritual’ notion of criminality that we see in Nazi mysticism.  The fact that we 
have become less superstitious as our scientific explanations acquire greater predictive 
validity only proves the point.  That our ability to empirically verify facts is imperfect is 
entirely separate from the claim that we must attempt to do so in order to have law.  Volkish 
Nazism deliberately ignored evidence, preferring superstition when so much better was 
commonly available, and had been for some time. Most of Nazism’s core claims about 
German Jews, from physical appearance to character traits, had had been disproven in the 
anthropologist Maurice Fishburg’s comprehensive 1913 study, the results of which were 
readily available and widely known in academic circles.
139
 As noted, Nazism used a ‘jargon’ 
of scientific terminology to justify some of its claims.  The movement also employed 
scientific methods in the development of weaponry, compulsory sterilization, and in human 
experimentation.
140
 Gas chambers, weaponry, and trains require biology, chemistry, and 
physics. But any evidence that did not reinforce stereotypes or fit with volkish instinct would 
be disregarded or ignored (in the manner of evidence regarding race or historical evidence of 
earlier German civilizations)
141
.  This response leads us directly to a second objection. 
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Terrible moral wrongs were committed by Allied States in the same era.  Fraser 
provides a number of useful illustrations in this respect, including eugenics projects, the 
compulsory sterilization of the disabled and racial segregation, each of which was far from 
unique to Nazi Germany.
142
  The reasoning behind segregation in The United States and 
elsewhere was informed by similarly outmoded (or dubious) ‘science’.  The argument thus 
proceeds that if one were to deny the status of law to the Nazi concept, on the basis that it 
deliberately contradicted available scientific evidence, then, the same must be true of 
American ‘law’ (until The Civil Rights Act of 1964 at very least). 
This is an important challenge. By implication, the legal system of the United States 
in that era would also fall outside the Fuller/Hart concept of law.  Yet there is a clear 
distinction to be drawn.  Evil legal systems can and do exist; perhaps we ought to regard the 
United States under segregation, or Sweden in an era of compulsory sterilization, as such 
regimes.  Nevertheless, those states had capacity to change underlying assumptions, in light 
of demonstrable fact, and hence to change their laws.  Opposition to Nazi ideology also 
played a significant part in the re-evaluation of domestic attitudes towards race and the 
legislative and judicial changes that followed.
143
  There may have been a lag between the 
scientific paradigm shift, a corresponding shift in popular opinion and, eventually, changes to 
substantive law.  In societies in which such attitudes are deeply ingrained, increasing levels 
(and standards) of education would appear to be a pre-requisite; the populace at large needs 
access to the aforementioned paradigm shifts before they can influence personal attitudes.
144
  
It is no comfort to those who suffered under segregation that change came too late.  
Nevertheless, the system was open to correction of whatever misguided beliefs about race 
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underlay segregation.  As Fraser notes, apologies continue to this day, as do attempts to 
somewhat rectify these past wrongs.  Nazism had no such capacity for change, apology, and 
correction.
145
  No evidence could have amended its preconceptions.  It is impossible to 
envisage a world in which a Nazi state might have admitted it was wrong about race, repealed 
all of the relevant legislation and yet remained ‘Nazi’.  This capacity is a central assumption 
within the Fuller/Hart concept of law, constitutionally, legislatively and judicially; 
empirically verifiable facts about the world might cause us to radically rethink 
preconceptions.
146
  Hart included ‘rules of change’ within his concept of law expressly for 
this reason; Fuller seems to assume that it is part of law’s very nature that its rules should be 
hostage to change over time.
147
 Furthermore, at a judicial level, when new evidence comes to 
light cases can be re-opened and decisions reversed.  This basic notion distinguishes legal 
systems which have made catastrophic errors in the past from a system that requires us to see 
law and unfettered, arbitrary power as the same thing.  Even a ‘wicked’ legal system, which 
fits within the Fuller/Hart concept of law, has this capacity for self-reflection and self-
improvement.  It can recognise and right its wrongs.  A system in which law and arbitrary, 
unfettered power are the same thing cannot; it has nothing to correct to and no amount of 
fact-finding and truth revelation will change its course.  In the volkish Nazi ‘concept of law’ 
this is reflected both in the notion of ‘volk’ as a would-be constitutional grundnorm and in the 
hostility towards fact-finding in court.    
Fraser provides an interesting parallel between the treatment of Nazi propagandist 
Julius Streicher at Nuremberg and the Nazi legal system. As editor of Der Stürmer, Streicher 
played a significant role in promoting virulent anti-Semitism prior to the Holocaust, using 
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what we would now readily identify as ‘hate speech’.  In the Nuremberg trials Streicher was 
found guilty of crimes against humanity on the basis of ‘incitement to murder and 
extermination’ and subsequently executed.  Fraser argues that this verdict is problematic. No 
evidence was introduced at trial to show that Streicher knew of ‘exterminatory’ practices.  It 
was not firmly established that his various racist rants had a causative effect. In fact, by the 
commencement of The Holocaust, Streicher had fallen from grace (and influence) to the 
extent that he was under house arrest. Fraser’s assessment is that Streicher was ‘convicted 
and executed because of who he was and not because of what he did’.148 As such, Fraser 
contends, Streicher was treated in a manner similar to defendants in Nazi courts towards the 
end of the regime.   
If we extend Fraser’s logic further, this might suggest that International Law falls 
outside the Fuller/Hart concept of law for precisely the same reason that I have argued the 
volkish concept falls outside. Fraser’s point about the Streicher verdict is defensible and in 
some ways convincing.  Telford Taylor, Chief Prosecutor at Nuremburg, expresses serious 
misgivings about the verdict.
149
  Again, however, there is a crucial distinction to be drawn 
between the volkish concept of law and the Fuller/Hart concept in this respect.  This 
distinction allows International Law to fall within that concept of law, while the volkish 
concept remains outside.
150
  Fraser’s critique makes sense precisely because fact was against 
Streicher’s sentence.  This is a serious criticism of a particular trial. By way of contrast, Nazi 
jurisprudence wished to make this a basis for all criminal prosecutions.  In our legal systems 
this sort of thing could happen, but this is wrong or at least highly problematic; Nazi reform 
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of the legal system was in large part an effort to ensure that that this sort of thing would 
happen and should be held up as an example of ‘true German law’.   
Of course, failure to pay due attention to empirical evidence is not a thing of the past 
in law and policy-making.  In 2008, Professor David Nutt was appointed Chair of the 
Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs in the United Kingdom, a body with a mandate to 
advise government on illegal drug use and to make recommendations on classification.  
Nutt’s findings in relation to the harm caused by various illicit substances undermined 
existing policy, as did his suggestion that such substances should be reclassified.  This led to 
clashes between Nutt and Cabinet members, culminating in Nutt’s dismissal on the basis that 
he ‘cannot be both a government adviser and a campaigner against government policy’.151  
In this example, the UK government denied empirical evidence in favour of 
entrenched belief.  Nevertheless, this does not require us to hold that there was no law in the 
UK at the time, even if one wishes to hold that law must be fact-led.  The Nutt example is 
instructive for two reasons.  First, as Fuller notes that the difference between good legal order 
and order that does enough to count as law at all is likely to be a matter of degree.  Perhaps an 
ideal legal system would always pay due regard to fact, and consistently demonstrate 
willingness to change received notions on the back of evidence. Existing legal systems are 
likely to have a patchier record.  There is a gulf between a less than perfect legal system and 
the sort of wanton disregard for evidence at every level that Hitler, Goebbels et al desired.  
The idea that law is fact-led also gives us a criterion for what good law, and good policy, 
ought to do. We may point to cases where fact is ignored in favour of a politically expedient 
outcome. But this does not mean that such a practice is endemic within a system, let alone its 
governing principle.  The precise distinction between ‘very bad law’ and ‘not law at all’ may 
be fine within the Fuller/Hart concept.  As a tentative suggestion, we might take it that the 
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scales automatically tip from ‘bad law’ to ‘not law at all’ wherever the notion of whom we 
consider a citizen (something like ‘the volk’) defies any sort of objectively verifiable test, 
even hypothetically.  Second, to hold that a commitment to the notion of empirically 
verifiable facts about the world about which our intuitions may be wrong is part of the 
concept of law is not to say that this is the only consideration.  Fact-tracking and due regard 
for scientific evidence are not all that matter.  They will not solve all legal and ethical issues.  
The episode involving David Nutt comes from a consultation period.  Unlike under Nazism, 
government policy is not ‘law’ without enactment in the United Kingdom.  While the 
argument from harm, presented by Nutt, ought to be given due regard, there are other issues 
to consider in matters of drug classification.  Many counter-arguments are also fact-led.  
Increasing the number of widely available, legal intoxicants may place a greater strain on 
already over-burdened health services, for example.  No one fact determines policy.  A good 
system will balance these arguments and reach the best policy that it can; a system of 
oppression will have a firmly held dogma that cannot be reversed.   
Finally, to believe that one’s experience of legal systems shows them to be inherently 
fact-led might be accused of naivety.  It might be proposed that government, policymakers 
and judges pay lip service to fact, but actually do something else.  The body politic thus falls 
for a trick, as do jurisprudents within the Fuller and Hart traditions (and probably a great 
many others). According to this position, law is the intuitions and sentiments of the powerful 
and absolutely nothing more.
152
  Our political and legal systems use fact and science as a 
‘stamp of legitimacy’ when it is politic to do so, the argument continues, just as Nazism did 
from time to time, with no real commitment to the revision of hypotheses on the basis of 
experiment and observation.  Space prohibits a full response to this proposition. But it has the 
weight of history against it.  Law often corrects itself on the basis of empirical evidence; legal 
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definitions are altered in light of scientific advancement; decisions are overturned in light of 
new evidence or discoveries; governments fail to secure convictions that would have been 
politically useful.  It is not only a fundamental feature, but also a great strength that law 
affords priority to empirically verifiable facts about the world about which our intuitions 
might be wrong.  Uncertainty is required for progress in science; it only develops by 
constantly doubting and reflecting upon its underlying assumptions.  The same is true of law.  
Our capacity to question and doubt our preconceptions, in the light of discoverable facts, is a 
prerequisite for social and legal progress.  We have seen recent and profound change when 
the Supreme Court of the United States and a referendum in the Republic of Ireland 
recognised that the principle of equality before the law should extend to same-sex marriage. 
This has happened in spite of millennia of irrational bigotry and pseudo-scientific arguments 
to the contrary. We do not know for certain the motivations behind these sorts of 
advancements. Judges could lie and referenda do not come with an explanation from the 
populace as to why they have voted the way that they have.  My point instead is that the 
burden of proof is surely with those who would hold that we are just as superstitious and 
irrational as ever. They are arguing against the general arc of history in spite of the 
occasional, atavistic, blip.  Legal and political systems in advanced Western Liberal 
Democracies are far from perfect.  The ‘will of the people’ might well be based on something 
other than fact and rationality, as the recent success of various populist movements 
suggest.
153
  Yet, as scientific knowledge has improved our legal systems have looked less 
oppressive over the longer term.  We no longer justify slavery, deny women the right to vote, 
or allow discrimination on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity and sexual orientation because 
of some spurious pseudo-science as we did in the past. The contemporary rise of the new 
right, with its distaste for fact-based argument, should not blind us to the direction in which 
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we have been moving. To ignore all of this, to insist that law and unfettered power are the 
same, is to cling to an intuition and ignore fact.  It is to accept the same mystic, anti-rational 
ideology that we saw as central to volkish Nazism.   
 
6. Conclusion – Substantive Moral Content in the Fuller/Hart Concept of Law 
Any concept of law whereby the legal system must be centrally concerned with fact 
brings with it a commitment to law’s substantive moral content. The incompatibility that we 
have seen between Nazism and the concept of law under discussion between Fuller and Hart 
has a direct relation to the moral bankruptcy of the regime.  This is not to leap from ‘is’ 
premise to ‘ought’ conclusion.   It is simply to say that whenever a society shares the basic 
features of a concept of law with Fuller and Hart, there is a promise made to those who are 
subject to it that facts will lead outcomes.  In the same way that we might honour any 
commitment well, minimally or not at all, we might have a legal system that upholds this 
promise well, minimally, or abandons this pledge in favour of unfettered, arbitrary power.  
Volkish, mystic Nazism had the third of these possibilities in mind; the moral bankruptcy of 
its vision and its concept of ‘law’ went hand in hand.    
The commitment to being fact-led is far from a panacea for all ills in law.  The argument 
presented here leaves untouched the possibility that certain types of evil regime might have 
law, even in the sense in which Fuller and Hart understood the term.
154
  Nevertheless, there is 
one specific type of oppression that this concept cannot support.  Consider the following 
extract from Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: 
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— Tell us, Dedalus, do you kiss your mother before you go to bed? 
Stephen answered: 
— I do. 
Wells turned to the other fellows and said: 
— O, I say, here’s a fellow says he kisses his mother every night before 
he goes to bed. 
The other fellows stopped their game and turned round, laughing. 
Stephen blushed under their eyes and said: 
— I do not. 
Wells said: 
— O, I say, here’s a fellow says he doesn’t kiss his mother before he 
goes to bed. 
They all laughed again...What was the right answer to the question? He 
had given two and still Wells laughed. 
155
 
 
There is no right answer.  Anything Stephen Dedalus does will produce the same 
response.
156
  It is no coincidence that Freisler humiliated defendants at trial, much like 
Joyce’s schoolyard bully.157  Freisler was the nearest thing that we had to the Nazi ‘ideal’, the 
blueprint for how senior officialdom wanted its judges to behave.  If we accept that a system 
is only law if it is committed to the possibility that fact might be in one’s favour, this 
particular type of evil cannot govern even a poor legal system. It has been beyond the scope 
of this paper to discuss how we should weigh up competing, valid arguments that are rooted 
in existing human knowledge. This is a question of what we mean by reason and justice, the 
central issues in western legal theory.  They remain our most important.  
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